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Abstract—Motivated by the transformative impact of deep
neural networks (DNNs) on different areas (e.g., image and speech
recognition), researchers and anti-virus vendors are proposing
end-to-end DNNs for malware detection from raw bytes that
do not require manual feature engineering. Given the security
sensitivity of the task that these DNNs aim to solve, it is important
to assess their susceptibility to evasion.
In this work, we propose an attack that guides binary-
diversification tools via optimization to mislead DNNs for mal-
ware detection while preserving the functionality of binaries.
Unlike previous attacks on such DNNs, ours manipulates in-
structions that are a functional part of the binary, which makes
it particularly challenging to defend against. We evaluated our
attack against three DNNs in white-box and black-box settings,
and found that it can often achieve success rates near 100%.
Moreover, we found that our attack can fool some commercial
anti-viruses, in certain cases with a success rate of 85%. We
explored several defenses, both new and old, and identified some
that can successfully prevent over 80% of our evasion attempts.
However, these defenses may still be susceptible to evasion by
adaptive attackers, and so we advocate for augmenting malware-
detection systems with methods that do not rely on machine
learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial examples, the artifacts created by test-time
evasion attacks against machine-learning (ML) algorithms,
have recently emerged as a threat to ML-based systems. For
example, adversarial examples can enable attackers to imper-
sonate users that are enrolled in face-recognition systems [91],
[92], fool street-sign recognition algorithms into misclassify-
ing street signs [30], and trick voice-controlled interfaces to
misinterpret commands [20], [78], [88].
In particular, adversarial examples are a potential threat to
malware detection—a fundamental computer-security problem
that is increasingly addressed with the help of ML models
(e.g., [4], [55], [80], [99]). In this domain, attackers are
interested in altering programs to mislead ML-based malware
detectors into misclassifying malicious programs as benign, or
vice versa. In doing so, attackers face a non-trivial constraint:
in addition to misleading the malware detectors, any alteration
of a program must not change its original, intended, functional-
ity. For example, a keylogger altered to evade being detected as
†Work partially done as a Ph.D. student at Carnegie Mellon University.
malware should still carry out its intended function, including
invoking necessary APIs, accessing sensitive files, and con-
necting to attackers’ servers. This constraint is arguably more
challenging than ones imposed by other domains (e.g., evading
image recognition without making the changes conspicuous
to humans [30], [91], [92]) as it is less amenable to being
encoded into traditional frameworks for generating adversarial
examples, and most changes to byte values are likely to break
a program’s syntax or semantics. In this work, we show that
the constraint of preserving functionality can be incorporated
into the process of generating adversarial examples to fool
state-of-the-art deep neural networks (DNNs) for malware
detection [55], [80].
Roughly speaking, malware-detection methods can be cat-
egorized as dynamic or static [11], [99]. Dynamic methods
(e.g., [42]) execute programs to learn behavioral features that
can be used for classification. In contrast, static methods
(e.g., [4], [55]) classify programs using features that can be
computed without execution. While potentially more accurate,
dynamic methods are more computationally expensive, and,
consequently, less ubiquitously deployed [11], [49]. Therefore,
we focus on static methods.
Several attacks have been proposed to generate adversarial
examples against DNNs for static malware detection [26], [50],
[56], [97]. To fool the DNNs while preserving functionality,
these attacks introduce adversarially crafted byte values in
regions that do not affect execution (e.g., at the end of
programs or between sections). These attacks can be defended
against by masking out or removing the added content before
classification (e.g., [57]); we confirm this empirically.
In this paper we show how binary-diversification tools—
tools for transforming programs at the binary level to create
diverse variants of the same program—that were originally
proposed to defend against code-reuse attacks [54], [77] can be
leveraged to evade malware-detection DNNs. While these tools
preserve the functionality of programs after transformation
by design, they are ineffective at evading malware detection
when applied naı¨vely (e.g., functionality-preserving random-
ization). To address this, we propose optimization algorithms
to guide the transformations of binaries to fool malware-
detection DNNs, both in settings where attackers have access
to the DNNs’ parameters (i.e., white-box) and ones where they
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have no access (i.e., black-box). The algorithms we propose
can produce program variants that often fool DNNs in 100%
of evasion attempts. Perhaps most worryingly, we find that
the attack samples produced by the algorithms are also often
effective at evading commercial malware detectors (in some
cases with success rates as high as 85%). Because our attacks
transform functional parts of programs, they are particularly
difficult to defend against, especially when augmented with
methods to deter static and dynamic analyses. We explore
potential mitigations to the attacks that we propose (e.g., via
preprocessing programs to normalize them before classifica-
tion [3], [18], [103]), but conclude that attackers may adapt to
circumvent these mitigations. This leads us to advocate against
relying only on ML-based techniques for malware detection,
as is becoming increasingly common [24].
In a nutshell, the contributions of our paper are as follows:
• We propose a novel functionality-preserving attack
against DNNs for malware detection from raw bytes
(Sec. III). The attack uses binary-diversification tech-
niques in a novel way to prevent defenses applicable
to prior attacks, and is applicable both in white-box
and black-box settings.
• We evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed attack in different settings, including against
commercial anti-viruses (Sec. IV). We also compare
our attack with prior attacks, and show that it achieves
comparable or higher success rates, while being more
challenging to defend against.
• We explore the effectiveness of prior and new defenses
against our proposed attack (Sec. V). While several
defenses seem promising to defend against specific
variants of the attack, we warn against the risk of
adaptive attackers.
Next, we review some background and related work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We start this section with background on DNNs for mal-
ware detection, which are the main target of our attacks.
Then, we discuss research on attacking and defending ML
algorithms generally, and malware detection specifically. We
end the section with background on binary randomization and
rewriting methods, which serve as building blocks for our
attacks.
A. DNNs for Malware Detection
In this work, we study attacks targeting two DNN archi-
tectures for detecting malware from the raw bytes of Windows
binaries (i.e., executables in Portable Executable format) [55],
[80]. The main appeal of these DNNs is that they achieve state-
of-the-art performance using automatically learned features,
instead of manually crafted features that require tedious human
effort (e.g., [4], [51], [44]). In fact, due to their desirable
properties, computer-security companies use DNNs similar to
the ones that we study (i.e., ones that operate on raw bytes and
use a convolution architectures) for malware detection [23]. As
these DNNs classify binaries without executing them, they fall
under the category of static detection methods [11], [99].
The DNNs proposed by prior work follow standard convo-
lutional architectures similar to the ones used for image clas-
sification [55], [80]. Yet, in contrast to image-based classifiers
that classify inputs from continuous domains, the malware-
detection DNNs classify inputs from discrete domains—byte
values of binaries. To this end, the DNNs were designed with
initial embedding layers that map each byte in the input to a
vector in R8. Once the input is represented in a real vector
space after the embedding, standard convolutional and non-
linear operations are performed by subsequent layers.
B. Attacking and Defending ML Algorithms
Attacks on Image Classification Adversarial examples—
inputs that are minimally perturbed to fool ML algorithms—
have emerged as challenge to ML. The majority of attacks in
prior work (e.g., [8], [10], [13], [33], [71], [75], [98], [105])
focused on DNNs for image-classification, and on finding
adversarial perturbations that have small Lp-norm (p typically
∈ {0, 2,∞}) that lead to misclassification when added to input
images. By limiting perturbations to small Lp-norms, attacks
aim to ensure that the perturbations are imperceptible to hu-
mans. Attacks are often formalized as optimization processes.
For example, Carlini and Wagner [13] proposed the following
formulation for finding adversarial perturbations that target a
class ct and have small L2-norms:
arg min
r
Losscw(x+ r, ct) + κ · ||r||2
where x is the original image, r is the perturbation, and κ is a
parameter to tune the L2-norm of the perturbation. Losscw is a
function that, when minimized, leads x+r to be (mis)classified
as ct. It is roughly defined as:
Losscw(x+ r, ct) = max
c6=ct
{Lc(x+ r)} − Lct(x+ r)
where Lc is the output for class c at the logits of the DNN—
the output of the one-before-last layer. Our attacks use Losscw
to mislead the malware-detection DNNs.
Attacks with Complex Objectives Most early attacks
reduce the Lp-norms of adversarial perturbations to maintain
perceptual similarity between the original images and their
corresponding adversarial examples. However, small Lp-norms
may be unnecessary or insufficient for maintaining perceptual
similarity [29], [90]. Moreover, while reducing the Lp-norms
is an objective that can easily integrated into processes for
generating adversarial examples, it is unlikely by itself to result
in attacks that affect systems in practice. Therefore, follow-up
attacks proposed adversarial examples that satisfy objectives
other than similarity as measured in Lp-norms. Similarly to
the attacks that we explore in this work, which aim to preserve
the functionality of transformed binaries, other attacks aim
to preserve certain properties of the adversarial artifacts that
are critical for their practicality. For example, in the realm
of face and street-sign detection and recognition, researchers
proposed ways to change the physical appearance of faces and
street signs to mislead detection and recognition systems [14],
[30], [91], [92]. In the speech-recognition domain, researchers
showed how to modify audio signals slightly such that they
would mislead speech-recognition systems when played [20],
[78], [88]. Last, researchers also showed that text classification
methods (e.g., for sentiment analysis) can be misled while
maintaining certain properties of the original text, such as its
meaning [63], [76], [93].
Attacks on Malware Detection Multiple attacks were
proposed to evade ML-based malware classifiers while pre-
serving the (malicious) functionality of the malware. Some
attacks (e.g., [25], [96], [102], [108]) tweak malware to mimic
benign files (e.g., adding benign code-snippets to malicious
PDF files). Other attacks (e.g., [1], [26], [35], [41], [50], [56],
[97]) tweak malware using gradient-based optimizations or
generative methods (e.g., to find which APIs to import). A third
type of attacks uses a combination of mimicry and gradient-
based optimizations [84].
Differently from some of the prior work (e.g., [1], [84],
[102]) which studied attacks against dynamic ML-based mal-
ware detectors, we explore attacks that target DNNs for mal-
ware detection from raw bytes (i.e., static detection methods).
Furthermore, the attacks we explore do not take advantage of
weaknesses in the feature-extraction process by introducing
adversarially crafted bytes to unreachable regions of the bi-
naries [50], [56], [97] (which may be possible to detect and
sanitize statically, see Sec. IV-C), or by mangling bytes in the
header of binaries [26] (which can be stripped before classi-
fication [83]). Instead, the attacks we propose transform the
original code of binaries in a functionality-preserving manner
to achieve misclassification. Nonetheless, we still compare the
evasion success rates of our attack with a representative prior
attack (see Sec. IV-C), to ensure that the additional properties
are not achieved at the expense of lower evasion success.
More traditionally, attackers use various obfuscation tech-
niques to evade malware detection. Packing [11], [85], [99],
[100]—encrypting binaries’ code and data, and then decrypting
them at run time—is commonly used to hide malicious content
from static detection methods. As we explain later (Sec. III-A)
we only consider unpacked binaries in this work, as is often
the case for static analysis methods [11], [55]. Attackers also
obfuscate binaries by substituting instructions with others or
altering the control flow graphs of binaries [16], [17], [45],
[99]. We demonstrate that such obfuscation methods do not
fool the malware-detection DNNs when applied naı¨vely (see
Sec. IV-B). To address this, our attacks leverage stochastic
optimization techniques to guide the transformation of binaries
and mislead malware detection.
Perhaps most closely related to our work is the recent work
on misleading ML algorithms for authorship attribution [67],
[79]. Meng et al. proposed an attack to mislead authorship
attribution at the binary level [67]. Unlike the attacks we
propose, Meng et al. leverage weaknesses in feature extraction
and modify debug information and non-loadable sections to
fool the ML models. Furthermore, their method leaves a
conspicuous footprint that the binary was modified (e.g., by
introducing multiple data and code sections to the binaries).
While this is potentially acceptable for evading author identifi-
cation, it may raise suspicion when evading malware detection.
Quiring et al. recently proposed an attack to mislead authorship
attribution from source code [79]. In a similar spirit to our
work, their attack leverages an optimization algorithm to guide
code transformations that change syntactic and lexical features
of the code (e.g., switching between printf and cout) to
mislead ML algorithms for authorship attribution.
Defending ML Algorithms Researchers in the area of
adversarial ML are actively seeking ways to defend against
adversarial examples. One line of work, called adversarial
training, aims to train robust models largely by augmenting the
training data with correctly labeled adversarial examples [33],
[47], [46], [58], [64], [98]. Another line of work proposes
algorithms to train certifiably (i.e., provably) robust defenses
against certain attacks [21], [52], [61], [69], [109]. Unfortu-
nately, these defenses are limited to specific types of perturba-
tions (e.g., ones with small L2- or L∞-norms). Moreover, they
often do not scale to large models that are trained on large
datasets. As discussed in Sec. V, amongst other limitations,
our evaluation shows that these defenses would also be too
expensive to practically mitigate our attacks. Some defenses
suggest that certain input transformations (e.g., quantization)
can “undo” adversarial perturbations before classification [37],
[62], [66], [86], [95], [106], [107]. In practice, however, it
has been shown that attackers can adapt to circumvent such
defenses [5], [6]. Additionally, the input transformations that
have been explored in the image-classification domain cannot
be applied in the context of malware detection. Prior work
has also shown that adaptive attackers [12] can circumvent
methods for detecting the presence of attacks (e.g., [31], [34],
[66], [68]). We expect that such attackers can circumvent
attempts to detect our attacks as well.
Prior work proposed ML-based malware-classification
methods designed to be robust against evasion [27], [44].
However, these methods either have low accuracy [44], or
target linear classifiers [27] which are unsuitable for detecting
malware from raw bytes.
Fleshman et al. proposed to make malware-detection DNNs
more robust by constraining the parameter weights in the
last layer to non-negative values [32]. Their approach aims
to prevent attackers from introducing additional features to
malware to decrease its likelihood of being classified correctly.
While this rationale holds for single-layer neural networks
(i.e., linear classifiers), DNNs with multiple layers constitute
complex functions where the addition of features at the input
may correspond to the deletion of features in deep layers. As
a result of the misalignment between the threat model and the
defense, we found that DNNs trained with this defense are
as vulnerable to prior attacks [56] as undefended DNNs. In
contrast, Fleshman et al. report that their defense is effective
against prior attacks. The failure of the attacks may have been
caused by the obfuscated gradients phenomenon [6].
C. Binary Rewriting and Randomization
Software diversification is a technique developed to pro-
duce diverse binary versions of programs, all with the
same functionality, to resist different kinds of attacks, such
as memory-corruption, code-injection, and code-reuse at-
tacks [59]. Diversification can be performed at the source-code
level (via the development of multiple implementations), at
compilation time (e.g., using a multicompiler), or after com-
pilation (by rewriting and randomizing programs’ binaries). In
this work, we build on diversification techniques after com-
pilation, at the binary level, as they have wider applicability
(e.g., self-spreading malware can use them to evade detection
without having access to the source code [72]), and are more
efficient (producing the binary after a transformation does not
require recompilation). Nevertheless, we expect that this work
can be extended to work with different diversification methods.
There is a large body of work on binary rewriting
from the programming-languages, computer-architecture, and
computer-security communities (e.g., [38], [54], [53], [65],
[77], [87], [104]). Some of the rewriting methods aim to
achieve higher-performing code via relatively expensive search
through the space of equivalent programs [65], [87]. Other
methods significantly increase the size of binaries, or may
leave a conspicuous sign that rewriting took place [38], [104].
We build on binary-randomization tools that have little-to-no
effect on the size or run time of the randomized binaries, thus
helping our attacks remain stealthy [54], [77]. We present these
tools and our extensions thereof in the following section.
III. TECHNICAL APPROACH
This section discusses the technical approach behind our
attack. Before delving into the details, we initially lay down
the threat model.
A. Threat Model
We assume that the attacker has white-box or black-box
access to DNNs for malware detection that receive raw bytes of
program binaries as input. In the white-box setting, the attacker
has access to the DNNs’ architectures and weights and is
able to efficiently compute the gradients of loss functions with
respect to the DNNs’ input via forward and backward passes.
On the other hand, the attacker in the black-box setting may
only query the model with a binary and receive the probability
estimate that the binary is malicious.
The weights of the DNNs are fixed and cannot be con-
trolled by the attacker (e.g., by poisoning the training data).
The attacker uses binary rewriting methods that are challenging
to undo to manipulate the raw bytes of binaries and cause
misclassification while keeping functionality intact. Attacks
may seek to cause malware to be misclassified as benign or
benign binaries to be misclassified as malware. The former
type of attack may cause malware to circumvent defenses and
be executed on a victim’s machine. The latter may be useful
to induce false positives, which may lead users to turn off or
ignore the defenses [39].
We also assume that the binaries are unpacked, as is
often the case for static malware-detection methods [11], [55].
Detecting packed binaries and unpacking them are problems
orthogonal to ours that have been addressed by other re-
searchers (e.g., [11], [15], [100]). Nonetheless, adversaries
may still use our attacks simultaneously with packing: As
packed binaries are usually unpacked before being classified by
static methods [11], adversaries can use our attacks to modify
binaries before packing them so that the binaries would be
misclassified once unpacked.
As is standard for ML-based malware detection from raw
bytes in particular (Sec. II-A), and for classification of inputs
from discrete domains in general (e.g., [60]), we assume that
the first layer of the DNN is an embedding layer. This layer
maps each discrete token from the input space to a vector of
real numbers via a function E(·). When computing the DNN’s
output F(x) on an input binary x, one first computes the
embeddings and feeds them to the subsequent layers. Thus,
if we denote the composition of the layers following the
embedding by H(·), then F(x) = H(E(x)). While the DNNs
we attack contain embedding layers, our attacks conceptually
apply to DNNs that do not contain such layers. Specifically, for
a DNN function F(x) = `n−1(. . . `i+1(`i(. . . `0(x) . . . )) . . . )
for which the errors can be propagated back to the (i + 1)th
layer, the attack presented below can be executed by defining
E(x) = `i(. . . `0(x) . . . ).
B. Functionality-Preserving Attack
The attack we propose iteratively transforms a given binary
x of class y (y=0 for benign binaries, and y=1 for malware)
until misclassification occurs or a maximum number of iter-
ations is reached. To keep the binary’s functionality intact,
the types of transformations are limited to ones that preserve
functionality. (The transformation types that we consider in
this work are detailed below.) In each iteration, the attack
picks a transformation type at random for each function, and
attempts to transform the function using it. For instance, if the
transformation type can replace certain instructions within a
function with functionally equivalent ones, a random subset
of those instructions will be selected for replacement. The
attempted transformation is applied only if the DNN becomes
more likely to misclassify the binary.
Algorithm 1: White-box attack against malware detec-
tion.
Input : F = H(E(·)), LF, x, y, niters
Output: xˆ
1 i← 0;
2 xˆ← RandomizeAll(x);
3 while F(xˆ) = y and i < niters do
4 eˆ← E(xˆ);
5 g ← ∂LF(xˆ,y)
∂eˆ
;
6 for f ∈ xˆ do
7 o← RandomTransformationType();
8 x˜← RandomizeFunction(xˆ, f, o);
9 e˜← E(x˜);
10 δf = e˜f − eˆf ;
11 if gf · δf > 0 then
12 xˆ← x˜;
13 end
14 end
15 i← i+ 1;
16 end
17 return xˆ;
Alg. 1 presents the pseudocode of the attack in the white-
box setting. The algorithm starts by transforming all the
functions in the binary in an undirected way. Namely, for
each function in the binary, a transformation type is selected at
random from the set of available transformations. The transfor-
mation is then applied to that function. When there are multiple
ways to apply the transformation to the function, one is chosen
at random. The algorithm then proceeds to further transform
the binary for up to niters iterations. Each iteration starts by
computing the embedding of the binary to a vector space,
eˆ, and the gradient, g, of the DNN’s loss function, LF, with
respect to the embedding (lines 4–5). The loss function we use
is the Carlini and Wagner loss function (Losscw) presented in
Sec. II. Ideally, to move the binary closer to misclassification,
we would manipulate the binary so that the difference of
its embedding from eˆ + αg (for some scaling factor α) is
minimized (see prior work for examples [50], [56]). However,
if applied without proper care, such manipulation would likely
change the functionality of the binary or cause it to become
ill-formed. Instead, we transform the binary via functionality-
preserving transformations. As the transformation types are
stochastic and may have many possible outputs (in some cases,
more than can be feasibly enumerated), we cannot estimate
their impact on the binary a priori. Therefore, we transform
each function, f , by attempting to apply a (randomly picked)
functionality-preserving transformation type at random (once
per iteration); we apply the transformation only if it shifts the
embedding in a direction similar to g (lines 6–14). More con-
cretely, if gf is the gradient with respect to the embedding of
the bytes corresponding to f , and δf is the difference between
the embedding of f ’s bytes after the attempted transformation
and its bytes before, then the transformation is applied only if
the cosine similarity (or, equivalently, the dot product) between
gf and δf is positive. Other optimization methods (e.g., genetic
programming [108]) and similarity measures (e.g., similarity
in the Euclidean space) that we tested did not perform as well.
If the input were continuous, it would be possible to
perform the same attack in a black-box setting after estimating
the gradients by querying the model (e.g., [43]). In our case,
however, it is not possible to estimate the gradients of the loss
with respect to the input, as the input is discrete. Therefore, the
black-box attack we propose follows a general hill-climbing
approach (e.g., [96]) rather than gradient ascent. The black-box
attack is conceptually similar to the white-box one, and differs
only in the condition checking whether to apply attempted
transformations: Whereas the white-box attack uses gradient-
related information to decide whether to apply a transforma-
tion, the black-box attack queries the model after attempting
to transform a function, and accepts the transformation only if
the probability of the target class increases.
Transformation Types In this work, we consider two
families of transformation types [54], [77], as well as their
combination. For the first family, we adopt and extend the
transformation types proposed in the in-place randomization
(IPR) work of Pappas et al. [77]. Given a binary to ran-
domize, Pappas et al. proposed to disassemble it and identify
functions and basic blocks, statically perform four types of
transformations that preserve the functionality of the code,
and then update the binary accordingly from the modified
assembly code. The four transformation types considered are:
1) to replace instructions with equivalent ones of the same
length (e.g., sub eax,4 → add eax,-4); 2) to reassign
registers within functions or a set of basic blocks (e.g., swap
all instances of ebx and ecx) if this does not affect code
that follows; 3) to reorder instructions, using a dependence
graph to ensure that no instruction appears before another one
it depends on; and 4) to change the order in which register
values are pushed to and popped from the stack to save them
across function calls.
To maintain the semantics of the code, the disassembly and
transformations are performed conservatively (e.g., speculative
disassembly, a disassembly technique that has a relatively high
likelihood of misidentifying code, is avoided). IPR does not
alter binaries’ sizes and has no measurable effect on their run
time [77].
The original implementation of Pappas et al. could not be
used to evade malware detection due to several limitations,
including ones preventing it from producing the majority of
functionally equivalent binary variants that are conceptually
achievable under the four transformation types. Thus, we
extend and improve the implementation in various ways. First,
we enable the transformations to compose. In other words,
unlike Pappas et al.’s implementation, our implementation
allows us to iteratively apply different transformation types
to the same function. Second, we apply transformations more
conservatively to ensure that the functionality of the binaries
is preserved (e.g., by not replacing add and sub instruc-
tions if they are followed by instructions that read the flags
register). Third, compared to the previous implementation,
our implementation can handle a larger number of instruc-
tions and additional function-calling conventions. In particular,
our implementation can rewrite binaries containing additional
instructions (e.g., shrd, shld, ccmove) as well as less
common calling conventions (e.g., nonstandard returns via
increment of esp followed by a jmp instruction) without
impacting the binaries’ functionality. Last, we fix bugs in the
original implementation (e.g., incorrect checks for writes to
memory after reads). Fig. 1 shows an example of transforming
code using IPR.
The second family of transformation types that we build
on is based on code displacement (Disp), proposed by Koo
and Polychronakis [54]. Similarly to IPR, Disp begins by
conservatively disassembling the binary. The original idea of
Disp is to move code that can be leveraged as a gadget in
code-reuse attacks to a new executable section in order to
break the gadget. The original code to be displaced has to
be at least five bytes in size so that it can be replaced with
a jmp instruction that passes the control to the displaced
code. If the displaced code contains more than five bytes, the
bytes after the jmp are replaced with trap instructions that
terminate the program; these would be executed if a code-
reuse attack is attempted. In addition, another jmp instruction
is appended immediately after the displaced code to pass the
control back to the instruction that should follow. Of course,
any displaced instruction that uses an address relative to the
instruction-pointer (i.e., IP) register is also updated to reflect
the new address after displacement. Disp has a minor effect on
binaries’ sizes (∼2% increase on average) and causes a small
amount of run-time overhead (<1% on average) [54].
We extend Disp in two primary ways. First, we make
it possible to displace any set of consecutive instructions
within the same basic block, not only ones that belong to
gadgets. Second, instead of replacing the original instructions
with traps, we replace them with semantic nops—sets of
instructions that cumulatively do not affect the memory or
register values and have no side effects [17]. These semantic
nops get jumped to immediately after the displaced code
is done executing. To create the semantic nops, we use the
context-free grammar described in Fig. 2. At a high-level, a
semantic nop can be an atomic instruction (e.g., nop), or
recursively defined as an invertible instruction that is followed
by a semantic nop and then by the inverse instruction (e.g.,
push eax followed by a semantic nop and then by pop
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push ebx
push edx
mov ebx, [ebp+4]
add ebx, 0x10
mov edx, [ebp+8]
mov [edx], ebx
pop edx
pop ebx
pop ebp
(55)
(89e5)
(53)
(52)
(8b5d04)
(83c310)
(8b5508)
(891a)
(5a)
(5b)
(5d)
(a) Original
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push ebx
push edx
mov ebx, [ebp+4]
sub ebx, -0x10
mov edx, [ebp+8]
mov [edx], ebx
pop edx
pop ebx
pop ebp
(55)
(89e5)
(53)
(52)
(8b5d04)
(83ebf0)
(8b5508)
(891a)
(5a)
(5b)
(5d)
(b) Equivalent instructions
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push ebx
push edx
mov edx, [ebp+4]
sub edx, -0x10
mov ebx, [ebp+8]
mov [ebx], edx
pop edx
pop ebx
pop ebp
(55)
(89e5)
(53)
(52)
(8b5504)
(83eaf0)
(8b5d08)
(8913)
(5a)
(5b)
(5d)
(c) Register reassignment
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push ebx
push edx
mov ebx, [ebp+8]
mov edx, [ebp+4]
sub edx, -0x10
mov [ebx], edx
pop edx
pop ebx
pop ebp
(55)
(89e5)
(53)
(52)
(8b5d08)
(8b5504)
(83eaf0)
(8913)
(5a)
(5b)
(5d)
(d) Instruction reordering
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push edx
push ebx
mov ebx, [ebp+8]
mov edx, [ebp+4]
sub edx, -0x10
mov [ebx], edx
pop ebx
pop edx
pop ebp
(55)
(89e5)
(52)
(53)
(8b5d08)
(8b5504)
(83eaf0)
(8913)
(5b)
(5a)
(5d)
(e) Register preservation
Fig. 1: An illustration of IPR. We show how the original code (a) changes after replacing instructions with equivalent ones
(b), reassigning registers (c), reordering instructions (d), and changing the order of instructions that save register values (e). We
provide the hex encoding of each instruction to its right. The affected instructions are boldfaced and colored in red.
1 S → Atom | S · S |
2 bswp r · S · bswp r |
3 xchg rh, rl · S · xchg rh, rl |
4 push r · Sr · pop r |
5 pushfd · Sef · popfd
6 Atom → Φ | nop | mov r, r
7 Sr → S | Sr · Sr | pushfd · Sef ,r · popfd
8 Sef → S | Sef · Sef |
9 arth r, v · Sef · invarth r, v |
10 push r · Sef ,r · pop r
11 Sef ,r → S | Sr | Sef | Sef ,r · Sef ,r |
12 arth r, v · Sef ,r |
13 logic r, v · Sef ,r
Fig. 2: A context-free grammar for generating semantic nops.
S is the starting symbol, Φ is the empty string, the symbol
arth indicates an arithmetic operation (specifically, add,
sub, adc, or sbb), invarth indicates its inverse, logic
indicates a logical operation (specifically, and, or, or xor),
and r and v indicate a register and a randomly chosen integer,
respectively.
eax), or as two consecutive semantic nops. When the flags
register’s value is saved (i.e., between pushfd and popfd
instructions), a semantic nop may contain instructions that
affect flags (e.g., add and then subtract a value from a register),
and when a register’s value is saved too (i.e., between push
r and pop r), a semantic nop may contain instructions that
affect the register (e.g., decrement it by a random value). Using
the grammar for generating semantic nops, for example, one
may generate a semantic nop that stores the flags and ebx
registers on the stack (pushfd; push ebx), performs an
operation that might affect both registers (e.g., add ebx,
0xff), and then restores the registers (pop ebx; popfd).
When using Disp, our attacks start by displacing code up
to a certain budget, to ensure that the resulting binary’s size
does not increase above a threshold (e.g., 1% above the original
size). We first divide the budget (expressed as the number of
bytes to be displaced) by the number of functions in the binary,
and we attempt to displace exactly that number of bytes per
function. If multiple options exist for what code in a function
to displace, the code to be displaced is chosen at random.
If a function does not contain enough code to displace, then
we attach semantic nops (occupying the necessary number
of bytes) after the displaced code to meet the per-function
budget. In the rare case that the function does not have any
basic block larger than five bytes, we skip that function. Fig. 3
illustrates an example of displacement where semantic nops
are inserted to replace original code, as well as after the
displaced code, to consume the budget. Then, in each iteration
of modifying the binary to cause it to be misclassified, new
semantic nops are chosen at random and used to replace the
previously inserted semantic nops if that moves the binary
closer to misclassification.
Some of the semantic nops contain integer values that can
be set arbitrarily (e.g., see line 12 of Fig. 2). In a white-box
setting, the bytes of the binary that correspond to these values
can be set to perturb the embedding in the direction that is
most similar to the gradient. Namely, if an integer value in the
semantic nop corresponds to the ith byte in the binary, we set
this ith byte to b ∈ {0, . . . , 255} such that the cosine similarity
between E(b) − E(xˆi) and gi is maximized. This process is
...
0x4587:
0x458b:
0x458f:
...
...
add ax, 0x10
sub bx, 0x10
cmp ax, bx
...
...
(6683c010)
(6683eb10)
(6639d8)
...
(a) Original code
...
0x4587:
0x458c:
0x458f:
...
...
0x4800:
0x4804:
0x4808:
0x4805:
0x4806:
0x4807:
0x480a:
0x480b:
0x480d:
...
...
jmp 0x4800
mov cx, cx
cmp ax, bx
...
...
add ax, 0x10
sub bx, 0x10
nop
pushfd
push ebx
add ebx, 0x1a
pop ebx
popfd
jmp 0x458c
...
...
(e974020000)
(6689c9)
(6639d8)
...
...
(6683c010)
(6683eb10)
(90)
(9c)
(53)
(83c31a)
(5b)
(9d)
(e97afdffff)
...
(b) After Disp
Fig. 3: An example of displacement. The two instructions
staring at address 0x4587 in the original code (a) are dis-
placed to to starting address 0x4800. The original instructions
are replaced with a jmp instruction and a semantic nop. To
consume the displacement budget, semantic nops are added
immediately after the displaced instructions and just before the
jmp the passes the control back to the original code. Semantic
nops are shown in boldface and red.
repeated each time a semantic nop is drawn to replace previous
semantic nops in white-box attacks.
Prior work has suggested methods for detecting and re-
moving semantic nops from binaries [18]. Such methods
might appear viable for defending against Disp-based attacks,
though as we discuss in Sec. V, attackers can leverage various
techniques to evade semantic-nop detection and removal.
Limitations While our implementation extends prior im-
plementations, it can still be further improved. For instance,
our implementation does not displace code that has been
displaced in early iterations. A more comprehensive imple-
mentation might apply displacements recursively. Furthermore,
the composability of IPR and Disp transformations can be
enhanced. Particularly, when applying both the Disp and IPR
transformations to a binary, both types of transformations
affect the original instructions of the binary. However, IPR
does not affect the semantic nops that are introduced by
Disp. Although there remains room for improvement, we
did not pursue the remaining engineering endeavors because
the attacks were successful despite the shortcomings of the
implementation.
Group Train Val. Test
Benign 10,349 3,848 5,337
Malicious 10,868 5,257 5,616
TABLE I: The number of benign and malicious binaries used
to train, validate, and test the DNNs.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of
our attack. We begin by providing details about the DNNs
and data used for evaluation. We then show that naı¨ve, random,
transformations that are not guided via optimization do not lead
to misclassification. Subsequently, we provide an evaluation of
variants of our attack under a white-box setting, and compare
with prior work. Then, we move to discuss evaluations of
our attack in the black-box setting, both against the DNNs
and commercial anti-viruses. We close the section with exper-
iments to validate that the attacks preserve functionality.
A. Datasets and Malware-Detection DNNs
To train malware-detection DNNs, we used malicious bi-
naries from a publicly available dataset that we augmented
with benign binaries from standard software packages, as is
standard (e.g., [51], [56]). In particular, we used malware
binaries from nine malware families1 that were published
as part of a malware-classification competition organized by
Microsoft [83]. This dataset contains raw binaries of malware
samples targeting Windows machines. As such, the binaries
adhere to the Portable Executable format (PE ; the standard
format for .dll and .exe files) [48]. However, to maintain
sterility and prevent the binaries from executing, the curators
removed their PE headers (which, among others, contain the
entry points of the code). In total, the dataset contains 21,741
binaries that were partitioned into training and test sets by the
dataset curators. We further partitioned the test set randomly
into one group for validation (i.e., model and hyperparameter
tuning) and another for final testing. Table I lists the number
of binaries in the training, validation, and test sets.
Prior work [2], [55], [80] used larger malware datasets
for training (in some cases containing two orders of magni-
tude more samples than the Microsoft dataset). Unfortunately,
however, the raw binaries from prior work’s datasets are
proprietary. Consequently, we resorted to using a publicly
available dataset. Nonetheless, the DNNs that we trained
achieve comparable performance to those of prior work.
To collect benign binaries, we installed standard packages
on a newly created 32-bit Windows 7 virtual machine and
gathered the PE binaries pertaining to these packages. Specifi-
cally, we used the Ninite and Chocolatey2 package managers to
install 179 packages. The packages that we installed included
popular ones that are commonly used by a variety of users
(such as Chrome, Firefox, WinRAR, Spotify, . . . ), as well as
packages that are likely to be used by specific user groups, such
as developers (e.g., PyCharm), academics (e.g., MiKTeX),
1Gatak, Kelihos v1, Kelihos v3, Lollipop, Obfuscator ACY, Ramnit, Simda,
Tracur, and Vundo.
2https://ninite.com/ and https://chocolatey.org/
Accuracy TPR @
DNN Train Val. Test 0.1% FPR
AvastNet 99.23% 98.29% 98.92% 80.28%
MalConv 99.96% 98.33% 99.15% 88.73%
TABLE II: The DNNs’ performance. We report the accuracies
on the different data partitions, as well as the TPR at the
operating point where the FPR equals 0.1%.
and graphics designers (e.g., Gimp). This resulted in 19,534
binaries that we partitioned into training, validation, and test
sets of comparable sizes to those for malware (see Table I).
When partitioning, we placed binaries from the same packages
in the same partitions to ensure that the DNNs learned to tell
apart malicious and benign binaries rather to than to associate
binaries of the same packages with each other.
Using the malicious and benign samples, we trained two
malware-detection DNNs. Both DNNs receive binaries’ raw
bytes as inputs and output the probability that the binaries
are malicious. The first DNN, proposed by Krcˇa´l et al. [55],
receives inputs up to 512 KB in size. We refer to it by
AvastNet , in reference to the authors’ affiliation. The second
DNN, proposed by Raff et al. [80], receives inputs up to 2 MB
in size. We refer to this DNN by MalConv , as per the authors’
naming. Except for the batch-size parameter, we used the same
training parameters reported in the papers. We set the batch
size to 32 due to memory limitations. In addition, when using
benign binaries for training, we excluded the headers. This is
both to remain consistent with the malicious binaries (which
do not include headers), but also to ensure that the DNNs
would not rely on header values that are easily manipulable for
classification [26]. As the results below demonstrate, excluding
the header leads to DNNs that are more difficult to evade.
The classification performance of the DNNs is reported in
Table II. Both DNNs achieve test accuracy of about 99%. Even
when restricting the false positive rates (FPRs) conservatively
to 0.1% (as is often done by anti-virus vendors [55]), the true
positive rates (TPRs) remain as high as 80–89% (i.e., 80–89%
of malicious binaries are detected). The performance results
that we computed are superior to the ones reported in the
original papers both for classification from raw bytes and from
manually crafted features [55], [80]. We believe the reason to
be that our dataset was restricted to nine malware families, and
expect the performance to slightly decrease when incorporating
additional malware families.
In addition to the two DNNs that we trained, we evaluated
the attacks using a publicly available DNN that was trained by
Anderson and Roth [2]. We refer to this DNN by Endgame ,
in reference to the authors’ affiliation. Endgame has a similar
architecture to MalConv . The salient differences are that: 1)
Endgame’s input dimensionality is 1 MB (compared to 2
MB for MalConv ); and 2) Endgame uses the PE header
for classification. On a dataset separate from ours that was
curated by a computer-security company, Endgame achieved
about 92% TPR when the FPR was restricted to 0.1% [2].
To evaluate attacks against the DNNs, we selected binaries
according to three criteria. First, the binaries had to be un-
packed. To this end, we used standard packer detectors (specif-
Group AvastNet MalConv Endgame
Benign 99 99 99
Malicious 72 95 86
TABLE III: The number of benign and malicious binaries
used to test our attacks against the three DNNs.
ically, Packerid [89] and Yara [101]) and deemed binaries as
unpacked only if none of the detectors exhibited a positive
detection. This method is similar to the one followed by Biondi
et al. [11].3 While the data used to train and evaluate the
performance of the DNNs included packed binaries (we could
not exclude potentially packed binaries from the Microsoft
dataset due to missing headers), the high accuracy of the DNNs
on the test samples suggests that the DNNs’ performance was
not impacted by (lack of) packing. Second, the binaries had
to be classified correctly and with high confidence by the
DNNs that we trained. In particular, malicious (resp., benign)
binaries had to be classified as malicious (resp., benign), and
the estimated probability that they are malicious had to be
above (resp., below) the threshold where the FPR (resp., false
negative rate, FNR) is 0.1%. Consequently, our evaluation of
the attacks’ success is conservative: the attacks would be more
successful for binaries that are initially classified correctly, but
not with high confidence. Third, the binaries’ sizes had to
be smaller than the DNNs’ input dimensionality. While the
DNNs can classify binaries whose size is larger than the input
dimensionality (as can be seen from the high classification
accuracy on the validation and test sets), we avoided large
binaries as a means to prevent evasion by displacing malicious
code outside the input range of the DNNs.
Using these criteria, we selected 99 benign binaries from
the test set to evaluate the attacks against each of the three
DNNs. Leading malware detection to misclassify these benign
samples can harm users’ trust in the defense [39]. Unfortu-
nately, we were unable to use the malicious binaries from
the Microsoft dataset to evaluate our attacks, as they lack the
PE headers, and so they cannot be disassembled as necessary
for the IPR and Disp transformations. To this end, we used
VirusShare [82]—an online repository of malware samples—
to collect malicious binaries belonging to the nine families that
are present in the Microsoft dataset (as indicated by the labels
that commercial anti-viruses assigned the samples). Following
this approach, we collected a variable number of binaries that
were unseen in training to test the attacks against each one
of the DNNs, as specified in Table III. The total number of
samples the we collected to evaluate the attacks is comparable
to that used in prior work on evading malware detection [50],
[56], [96], [97].
B. Randomly Applied Transformations
We first evaluated whether naı¨vely transforming binaries
at random would lead to evading the DNNs. To do so, for
each binary that we used to evaluate the attacks we created
200 variants using the IPR and Disp transformations and
classified them using the DNNs. If any of the variants was
3Biondi et al. used three packer-detection tools instead of two. Unfortu-
nately, we were unable to get access to one of the proprietary tools.
misclassified by a DNN, we would consider the evasion
attempt successful. We set Disp to increase binaries’ sizes
by 5% (i.e., the displacement budget was set to 5% of the
binary’s original size). We selected 200 and 5% as parameters
for this experiment because our attacks were executed for 200
iterations at most, and achieved almost perfect success when
increasing binaries’ sizes by 5% (see below).
Except for a single benign binary that was misclassified by
MalConv after being transformed, no other misclassification
occurred. Hence, we can conclude that the DNNs are robust
against naı¨ve transformations, and that more principled ap-
proaches are needed to mislead them.
C. White-Box Attacks vs. DNNs
In the white-box setting, we evaluated seven variants of our
attack. One variant, to which refer by IPR, relies on the IPR
transformations. Three variants, Disp-1, Disp-3, and Disp-5,
rely on the Disp transformations, where the numbers indicate
the displacement budget as a percentage of the binaries’ sizes
(e.g., Disp-1 increases binaries’ sizes by 1%). The last three
attack variants, IPR+Disp-1, IPR+Disp-3, and IPR+Disp-5,
use the IPR and Disp transformations combined. We executed
the attacks up to 200 iterations and stopped early if the binaries
were misclassified with high confidence. For malicious (resp.,
benign) binaries, this meant that they were misclassified as
benign (resp., malicious) with an estimated probability that
they are malicious below the probability where the FPR (resp.,
FNR) is 0.1%. We set 5% as the maximum displacement
budget and 200 as the maximum number of iterations, as
we empirically found that the attacks were almost always
successful with these parameters.
In addition to our attacks, we implemented and evaluated
an attack proposed by Kreuk et al. [56]. To mislead DNNs,
the attack of Kreuk et al. appends adversarially crafted bytes
to binaries. These bytes are crafted via an iterative algorithm
that first computes the gradient gi of the loss with respect to
the embedding E(xi) of the binary xi at the ith iteration, and
then sets the adversarial bytes to minimize the L2 distance of
the new embedding E(xi+1) from E(xi)+sign(gi), where 
is a scaling parameter. We tested three variants of the attack,
denoted by Kreuk -1, Kreuk -3, and Kreuk -5, which increase
the binaries’ sizes by 1%, 3%, and 5%, respectively. As a loss
function, we used Losscw. Similarly to our attacks, we executed
Kreuk et al.’s attacks up to 200 iterations, stopping sooner if
misclassification with high confidence occurred. Furthermore,
we set =1, as we empirically found that it leads to high
evasion success.
We measured the success rates of attacks by the percentage
of binaries that were misclassified. The results of the exper-
iment are provided in Fig. 4. One can immediately see that
attacks using the Disp transformations were more successful
than IPR. In fact, IPR was able to mislead only Endgame ,
achieving 62% success rate at misclassifying malicious bina-
ries as benign, and 74% success rate at misclassifying benign
binaries as malicious. IPR was unable to mislead AvastNet
and MalConv in any attempt. This indicates that using bina-
ries’ headers for classification, similarly to Endgame , may
lead to more vulnerable models than when excluding the
header.
In contrast to IPR, other variants of our attack achieved
considerable success. For example, Disp-5 achieved high-
confidence misclassification in all attempts, except when at-
tempting to mislead AvastNet to misclassify benign binaries,
where 81% of the attempts succeeded. As one would expect,
attacks with higher displacement budget were more successful.
Specifically, attacks with 5% displacement budget were more
successful than ones with 3%, and the latter were more
successful than attacks with 1% displacement budget.
In addition to achieving higher success rates, another
advantage of Disp-based attacks over IPR-based ones is their
time efficiency. While displacing instruction at random from
within a function with n instructions has O(n) time complex-
ity, certain IPR transformations have O(n2) time complexity.
For example, reordering instructions requires building a depen-
dence graph and extracting instructions one after the other. If
every instruction in a function depends on previous ones, this
process takes O(n2) time. In practice, we found that while
Disp-based attacks took about 159 seconds to run on average,
IPR-based ones took 606 seconds.
While IPR had limited success, combining IPR with Disp
achieved higher success rates than respective Disp-only attacks
with the same displacement budget. For example, IPR+Disp-
1 had 6% higher success rate than Disp-1 when misleading
Endgame to misclassify a malicious binary as benign (97% vs.
91% success rate). Thus, in certain situations, Disp and IPR
can be combined to fool the DNNs while increasing binaries’
sizes less than Disp alone.
The variants of Kreuk et al.’s attack achieved success rates
comparable to variants of our attack. For example, Kreuk -5
was almost always able to mislead the DNNs—it achieved 99%
and 98% success rate when attempting to mislead Endgame
and MalConv , respectively, to misclassify malicious binaries,
and 100% success rate in all the other attempts. One can also
see that the success rate increased as the attacks increased the
binaries’ sizes. In particular, Kreuk -5 was more successful at
misleading the DNNs than Kreuk -3, which, in turn, was more
successful than Kreuk -1.
While Kreuk et al.’s attack achieved success rates that
are comparable to ours, it is important to highlight that their
attack is easier to defend against. As a proof of concept,
we implemented a sanitization method to defend against the
attack. The method finds all the sections that do not contain
instructions (using the IDAPro disassembler [40]) and masks
the sections’ content with zeros. As Kreuk et al.’s attack does
not introduce code to the binaries, the defense masks the
adversarial bytes that it introduces. Consequently, the evasion
success rates of the attack drop significantly. For example, the
success rates of Kreuk -5 against MalConv drop to 1% and
11% for malicious and benign binaries, respectively. At the
same time, the defense has little-to-no effect on our attacks.
For example, Disp-5 achieves 91% and 100% success rates
for malicious and benign binaries, respectively. Moreover, the
classification accuracy remains high for malicious (99%) and
benign (93%) binaries after the defense.
D. Black-Box Attacks vs. DNNs
As explained in Sec. III, because the DNNs’ input is
discrete, estimating gradient information to mislead them in
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Fig. 4: Attacks’ success rates in the white-box setting. For each attack and DNN, we provide the percentage of misclassified
malicious (a) and benign (b) binaries. The brightly colored bars show the percentage of binaries that were misclassified with
high confidence.
a black-box setting is not possible. To this end, the black-box
version of Alg. 1 uses a hill-climbing approach to query the
DNN after each attempted transformation to decide whether
to keep the transformation. Because querying the DNNs after
each attempted transformation leads to a significant increase
in run time of the attacks (∼30× on a machine with GeForce
GTX 980 GPU), we limited our experiments to Disp trans-
formations with a displacement budget of 5%, and attempted
to mislead the DNNs to misclassify malicious binaries. We
executed the attacks up to 200 iterations and stopped early if
misclassification occurred.
The attacks were most successful against Endgame ,
achieving a success rate of 97%. In contrast, 33% of the
evasion attempts against MalConv succeeded, and none of
attempts against AvastNet were successful. In cases of failure,
we observed that the optimization process was getting stuck in
local minimas. We believe that it may be possible to enhance
the performance of the attacks in such cases by deploying
methods for overcoming local minimas (e.g., the Metropolis
algorithm [73], or Monte-Carlo tree search [94]).
Motivated by the universality property of adversarial ex-
amples [70] and the finding of Kreuk et al. that adversarial
bytes generated for one binary may lead to evasion when
appended to another binary [56], we wanted to see if the
transformations applied to one binary can lead to evasion when
applied to another. If so, attackers in a black-box setting may
invest considerable effort to transform one binary to mislead
malware-detection and then apply the same transformations
to other binaries. We focused on Disp transformations and
tested whether the semantic nops that were added to certain
binaries via the Disp-5 attack in the white-box setting lead to
evasion when added to other binaries. To do so, we developed
a modified version of Disp that displaces code within binaries
at random, but instead of drawing the semantic nops randomly,
it borrows them from another previously transformed binary.
We tested this approach with malicious binaries and found
that it leads to relatively high success rates. For AvastNet
and Endgame , certain transformations led to evasion success
rates as high as 75% and 86%, respectively, when borrowed
from one binary and applied to other binaries (i.e., merely
14%–25% lower success rates than for white-box attacks). The
success rates were more limited against MalConv , achieving
a maximum of 24%.
E. Transferability of Attacks to Commercial Anti-Viruses
To assess whether our attacks affect commercial anti-
viruses, we tested how the binaries that were misclassified
by the DNNs with high confidence in the white-box setting
get classified by anti-viruses available via VirusTotal [19]—
an online service that aggregates the results of 68 commercial
anti-viruses. Since anti-viruses often rely on ML for malware
detection, and since prior work has shown that adversarial
examples that evade one ML model often evade other models
(a phenomenon called transferability) [33], [74], we expected
that the malicious (resp., benign) binaries generated by our
attacks would be classified as malicious by fewer (resp., more)
anti-viruses than the original binaries.
As a baseline, we first classified the original binaries
using the VirusTotal anti-viruses. As one would expect, all
the malicious binaries were detected by several anti-viruses.
The median number of anti-viruses that detected any particular
malware binary as malicious was 55, out of 68 total anti-
viruses. In contrast, the original benign binaries were detected
by a median of 0 anti-viruses, with a total of five false
positives across all binaries and anti-viruses. To further gauge
the accuracy of the commercial anti-viruses, we used them to
classify binaries that were transformed at random using the
Disp and IPR transformation types (in the same manner as
Sec. IV-B). We found that certain anti-viruses were susceptible
to such simple evasion attempts—the median number of anti-
viruses that detected the malicious binaries correctly decreased
to 42. At the same time, the median number of anti-viruses that
detected benign binaries as malicious remained 0. Presumably,
some anti-viruses were evaded by random transformations due
to using fragile detection mechanisms, such as signatures.
Table IV summarizes the effect of our attacks on the
number of positive detections (i.e., classification of binaries
as malicious) by the anti-viruses. Compared to the original
malicious binaries and ones that were transformed at random,
the malicious binaries transformed by our attacks were de-
tected as malicious by fewer anti-viruses. The median number
of anti-viruses that correctly detected the malicious binaries
decreased from 55 for the original binaries and 42 for ones
transformed at random to 33–36, depending on the attack
variant and the targeted DNN. According to a Kruskal-Wallis
test, this reduction is statistically significant (p <0.01 after
Bonferroni correction). In other words, the malicious binaries
that were transformed by our attacks were detected by only
49%–53% of the VirusTotal anti-viruses in the median case.
The number of positive detections of benign binaries in-
creased after they were transformed by our attacks: The median
number of anti-viruses that detected the benign binaries as
malicious was one or two, depending on the attack variant and
the targeted DNN. In certain cases, the number of positive
detections was as high as 19 (i.e., 28% of the VirusTotal
anti-viruses reported the binary as malicious). Except for one
attack (IPR targeting Endgame), the increase in the number of
detections is statistically significant (p <0.01 after Bonferroni
correction), according to a Kruskal-Wallis test.
Our attacks evaded a larger number of anti-viruses com-
pared to random transformations, likely due to transferring
from our DNNs to ML detectors that are used by the anti-
viruses. A glance at the websites of the anti-viruses’ vendors
showed that 15 of the 68 vendors explicitly advertise relying on
ML for malware detection. These anti-viruses were especially
susceptible to evasion by our attacks. Of particular note, one
vendor advertises that it relies solely on ML for malware
detection. This vendor’s anti-virus misclassified 78% of the
benign binaries that were produced by one variant of our
attack as malicious. In general, a median of 1–2 anti-viruses
(from the 15 vendors) misclassified benign binaries that were
processed by our attacks as malicious. Even more concerning,
a popular anti-virus whose vendor reports to rely on ML
misclassified 85% of the malicious binaries produced by a
variant of our attack as benign. Generally, malicious binaries
that were produced by our attacks were detected by a median
number of 7–9 anti-viruses of the 15—down from 12 positive
detections for the original binaries. All in all, while online
advertising (or lack thereof) is a weak indicator of the nature
of detectors used by anti-viruses (e.g., some prominent vendors
do not explicitly advertise the use of ML), our results support
that binaries that were produced by our attacks were able to
evade ML-based detectors that are used by anti-virus vendors.
F. Correctness
A key feature of our attacks is that they transform binaries
to mislead DNNs while preserving their functionality. We
followed standard practices from the binary-diversification
literature [53], [54], [77] to ensure that the functionality of
the binaries was kept intact after being processed by our
attacks. First, we transformed ten different benign binaries
(e.g., python.exe of Python version 2.7, and Cygwin’s4
less.exe and grep.exe) with our attacks and manually
validated that they functioned properly after being transformed.
For example, we were still able to search files with grep
after the transformations. Second, we transformed the .exe
and .dll files of a stress-testing tool5 with our attacks and
checked that the tool’s tests passed after the transformations.
Using stress-testing tools to evaluate the correctness of binary-
transformation methods is common, as such tools are expected
to cover most branches affected by the transformations. Third,
and last, we also transformed ten malware binaries and used
the Cuckoo Sandbox [36]—a popular sandbox for malware
analysis—to check that their behavior remained the same. All
ten binaries attempted to access the same hosts, IP addresses,
files, APIs, and registry keys before and after being trans-
formed.
V. DISCUSSION
Our proposed attacks achieved high success rates at fooling
DNNs for malware detection in white-box and black-box
settings. The attacks were also able to mislead commercial
anti-viruses, especially ones that leverage ML algorithms. To
protect users and their systems, it is important to develop
mitigation measures to make malware detection robust against
evasion by our attacks. Moreover, it is important to consider
ways to extend our attacks to other settings to understand the
weaknesses of other systems and help improve their security.
Next, we discuss potential mitigations and extensions to our
attacks.
A. Potential Mitigations
Prior Defenses We considered several prior defenses to
mitigate our attacks, but, unfortunately, most showed little
promise. For instance, adversarial training (e.g., [33], [58])
is infeasible, as the attacks are computationally expensive.
Depending on the attack variant, it took an average of 159
or 606 seconds to run an attack. As a result, running just
a single epoch of adversarial training would to take several
weeks (using our hardware configuration), as each iteration
of training requires running an attack for every sample in
the training batch. Moreover, while adversarial training might
increase the DNNs’ robustness against attackers using certain
transformation types, attackers using new transformation types
may still succeed at evasion [29]. Defenses that provide formal
guarantees (e.g., [52], [69]) are even more computationally
expensive than adversarial training. Moreover, those defenses
are restricted to adversarial perturbations that, unlike the ones
4https://www.cygwin.com/
5https://www.passmark.com/products/performancetest/
DNN IPR Disp-1 Disp-3 Disp-5 IPR+Disp-1 IPR+Disp-3 IPR+Disp-5
AvastNet - 36 35 36 36 35 36
Endgame 33 35 36 35 35 36 35
MalConv - 36 35 36 36 35 36
(a) Malicious binaries
DNN IPR Disp-1 Disp-3 Disp-5 IPR+Disp-1 IPR+Disp-3 IPR+Disp-5
AvastNet - 2 2 1 2 2 1
Endgame 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
MalConv - 1 1 1 1 1 1
(b) Benign binaries
TABLE IV: The median number of VirusTotal anti-viruses that positively detected (i.e., as malicious) malicious (a) and benign
(b) binaries that were transformed by our white-box attacks (columns) to mislead the different DNNs (rows). The median number
of anti-viruses that positively detected for the original malicious and benign binaries is 55 and 0, respectively. Cases in which
the change in the number of detections is statistically significant are in bold.
produced by our attacks, have small L∞- and L2-norms. Prior
defenses that transform the input before classification (e.g.,
via quantization [107]) are designed mainly for images and do
not directly apply to binaries. Lastly, signature-based malware
detection would not be effective, as our attacks are stochastic
and produce different variants of the binaries after different
executions.
Differently from prior attacks on DNNs for malware de-
tection [50], [56], [97], our attacks do not merely append
adversarially crafted bytes to binaries, or insert them between
sections. Such attacks may be defended against by detecting
and sanitizing the inserted bytes via static analysis methods
(e.g., similarly to the proof of concept shown in Sec. IV-C,
or using other methods [57]). Instead, our attacks transform
binaries’ original code, and extend binaries only by inserting
instructions that are executed at run time at various parts of the
binaries. As a result, our attacks are difficult to defend against
via static or dynamic analyses methods (e.g., by detecting and
removing unreachable code), especially when augmented by
measures to evade these methods.
Binary normalization [3], [18], [103] is an approach that
was proposed to enhance malware detection that seemed viable
for defending against our attacks. The high-level idea of
normalization is to employ certain transformations to map
binaries to a standard form and thus undo attackers’ evasion
attempts before classifying the binaries as malicious or benign.
For example, Christodorescu et al. proposed a method to detect
and remove semantic nops from binaries before classification,
and showed that it improves the performance of commercial
anti-viruses [18]. To mitigate our Disp-based attacks, we
considered using the semantic nop detection and removal
method followed by a method to restore the displaced code
to its original location. Unfortunately, we realized that such
a defense can be undermined using opaque predicates [22],
[72]. Opaque predicates are predicates whose value (w.l.g.,
assume true) is known a priori to the attacker, but is hard
for the defender to deduce. Often, they are based on NP -hard
problems [72]. Using opaque predicates, attackers can produce
semantic nops that include instructions that affect the memory
and registers only if an opaque predicate evaluates to false.
Since opaque predicates are hard for defenders to deduce, the
defenders are likely to have to assume that the semantic nops
impact the behavior of the program. As a result, the semantic
nops would survive the defenders’ detection and removal
attempts. As an alternative to opaque predicates, attackers can
also use evasive predicates—predicates that evaluate to true
or false with an overwhelming probability (e.g., checking if a
randomly drawn 32-bit integer is equal to 0) [9]. In this case,
the binary will function properly the majority of the time, and
may function differently or crash once every many executions.
The normalization methods proposed by prior work would
not apply to the transformations performed by our IPR-based
attacks. Therefore, we explored methods to normalize binaries
to a standard form to undo the effects of IPR before classi-
fication. We found that a normalization process that leverages
the IPR transformations to map binaries to the form with
the lowest lexicographic representation (where the alphabet
contains all possible 256 byte values) is effective at preventing
IPR-based attacks. Formally, if [x] is the equivalence class
of binaries that are functionally equivalent to x and that
can be produced via the IPR transformation types, then the
normalization process produces an output norm(x) ∈ [x], such
that, norm(x) ≤ xi for every xi ∈ [x]. Alg. 2 in App. A
presents an algorithm that computes the normalized form of
a binary when executed for a large number of iterations, and
approximates it when executed for a few iterations. At a high
level, the algorithm applies the IPR transformations iteratively
in a way that attempts to reduce the lexicographic repre-
sentation after every iteration. We found that executing the
algorithm for ten iterations is sufficient to defend against IPR-
based attacks. In particular, we executed the normalization
algorithm using the malicious and benign binaries produced
by the IPR-based attacks to fool Endgame in the white-box
setting, and found that the success rates dropped to 3% and 0%,
respectively, compared to 62% and 74% before normalization.
At the same time, the classification accuracy over the original
binaries was not affected by normalization. As our experiments
in Sec. IV have shown, generating functionally equivalent vari-
ants of binaries via random transformations results in correct
classifications almost all of the time. Normalization of binaries
to the minimal lexicographic representation deterministically
leads to the specific functionally equivalent variants that get
correctly classified with high likelihood.
Instruction Masking While normalization was useful for
defending against IPR-based attacks, it cannot mitigate the
more pernicious Disp-based attacks that are augmented with
opaque or evasive predicates. Moreover, normalization has the
general limitations that attackers could use transformations
that the normalization algorithm is not aware of or could ob-
fuscate code to inhibit normalization. Therefore, we explored
additional defensive measures. In particular, motivated by the
fact that randomizing binaries without the guidance of an
optimization process is unlikely to lead to misclassification, we
explored whether masking instructions at random can mitigate
attacks while maintaining high performance on the original
binaries. The defense works by selecting a random subset of
the bytes that pertain to instructions and masking them with
zeros (a commonly used value to pad sections in binaries).
While the masking is likely to result in an ill-formed binary
that is unlikely to execute properly (if at all), the masking
only occurs before classification, which does not require a
functional binary. Depending on the classification result, one
can decide whether or not to execute the unmasked binary.
We tested the defense on binaries generated via the
IPR+Disp-5 white-box attack and found that it is effective
at mitigating attacks. For example, when masking 25% of the
bytes pertaining to instructions, the success rates of the attack
decreases from 83%–100% for malicious and benign binaries
against the three DNNs to 0%–20%, while the accuracy
on the original samples was only slightly affected (e.g., it
became 94% for Endgame). Masking less than 25% of the
instructions’ bytes was not as effective at mitigating attacks,
while masking more than 25% led to a significant decrease in
accuracy on the original samples.
Detecting Adversarial Examples To prevent binaries trans-
formed with our attacks (i.e., adversarial examples) from
fooling malware detection, defenders may attempt to deploy
methods to detect them. In cases of positive detections of
adversarial examples, defenders may immediately classify
them as malicious (regardless of whether they were originally
malicious or benign). For example, because Disp-based at-
tacks increase binaries’ sizes and introduce additional jmp
instructions, defenders may train statistical ML models that
use features such as binaries’ sizes and the ratio between
jmp instructions and other instructions to detect adversarial
examples. While training relatively accurate detection models
may be feasible, we expect this task to be difficult, as the
attacks increase binaries’ sizes only slightly (1%–5%), and do
not introduce many jmp instructions (7% median increase for
binaries transformed via Disp-5). Furthermore, approaches for
detecting adversarial examples are likely to be susceptible to
evasion attacks (e.g., by introducing instructions after opaque
predicates to decrease the ratio between jmp instructions
and others). Last, another risk that defenders should take
into account is that the defense should be able to precisely
distinguish between adversarial examples and non-adversarial
benign binaries that are transformed by similar methods to
mitigate code-reuse attacks [54], [77].
Takeaways While masking a subset of the bytes that
pertain to instructions led to better performance on adversarial
examples, it was still unable to prevent all evasion attempts.
Although the defense may raise the bar to attackers, and make
attacks even more difficult if combined with a method to detect
adversarial examples, these defenses do not provide formal
guarantees and so attackers may be able to adapt to undermine
them. For example, attackers may build on techniques for
optimization over expectations to generate binaries that would
mislead the DNNs even when masking a large number of
instructions, in a similar manner to how attackers can evade
image-classification DNNs under varying lighting conditions
and camera angles [7], [30], [91], [92]. In fact, prior work
has already demonstrated how defenses without formal guar-
antees are often vulnerable to adaptive, more sophisticated,
attacks [6]. Thus, since there is no clear defense to prevent
attacks against the DNNs that we studied in this work, or
even general methods to prevent attackers from fooling ML
models via arbitrary perturbations, we advocate for augmenting
malware-detection systems with methods that are not based on
ML (e.g., ones using templates to reason about the semantics
of programs [17]), and against the use of ML-only detection
methods, as has become recently popular [24].
B. Potential Extensions
Our work focuses on attacks targeting DNNs for malware
detection from raw bytes. Nevertheless, we believe that it can
be extended to help study and improve the robustness of other
malware-detection methods. For example, prior work studied
the use of n-gram features for malware classification [51], [81].
By transforming binaries, our attacks can potentially change
the n-gram statistics to evade malware detection.
Another potential extension to our work is to study and
improve the robustness of clone-search methods (e.g., [28])
that are often used in reverse engineering for studying new
malware, detecting patent infringements, or finding vulnerabili-
ties in software. Ding et al. recently suggested the use of neural
networks to map assembly code to vector representations that
are similar for clones and different for non-clones [28]. Build-
ing on our attacks, we believe that attackers could manipulate
the representations generated by such neural networks to make
the representations of clones different (e.g., to make it difficult
to study new malware), or make the representations of non-
clones similar (e.g., to support a fake patent infringement
case).
VI. CONCLUSION
Our work proposes evasion attacks on DNNs for malware
detection. Differently from prior work, the attacks do not
merely insert adversarially crafted bytes to mislead detection.
Instead, guided by optimization processes, our attacks trans-
form the instructions of binaries to fool malware detection
while keeping functionality of the binaries intact. As a result,
these attacks are challenging to defend against. We conserva-
tively evaluated different variants of our attack against three
DNNs under white-box and black-box settings, and found the
attacks successful as often as 100% of the time. Moreover, we
found that the attacks pose a security risk to commercial anti-
viruses, particularly ones using ML, achieving evasion success
rates of up to 85%. We explored several potential defenses, and
found some to be promising. Nevertheless, adaptive adversaries
remain a risk, and we recommend the deployment of multiple
detection algorithms, including ones not based on ML, to raise
the bar against such adversaries.
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APPENDIX
A. In-Place Normalization
In this section, we present a normalization process to
map binaries to a standard form and undo the effect of
the IPR transformations on classification. Specifically, the
normalization process maps binaries to the functionally equiv-
alent variant with the lowest lexicographic presentation that
is achievable via the IPR transformation types. For each
transformation type, we devise an operation that would de-
crease a binary’s lexicographic representation when applied:
1) instructions would be replaced with equivalent ones only
if the new instructions are lexicographically lower (Eqv ); 2)
registers in functions would be reassigned only if the byte
representation of the first impacted instruction would decrease
(Regs); 3) instructions would be reordered such that each
time we would extract the instruction from the dependence
graph with the lowest byte representation that does not depend
on any of the remaining instructions in the graph (Ord1 );
and 4) push and pop instructions that save register values
across function calls would be reordered to decrease the
lexicographic representation while maintaining the last-in-first-
out order (Ord2 ). Fig. 5 depicts an example of replacing one
instruction with an equivalent one via Eqv to decrease the
lexicographic order of code.
Unfortunately, as shown in Fig. 6, when the different types
of transformation types are composed, applying individual nor-
malization operations does not necessarily lead to the binary’s
variant with the minimal lexicographic representation, as the
procedure may be stuck in a local minima. To this end, we
propose a stochastic algorithm that is guaranteed to converge
to binaries’ normalized variants if executed for a sufficiently
large number of iterations.
sub eax, -0x20
test ebx, ebx
(83e8e0)
(85db)
(a)
add eax, 0x20
or ebx, ebx
(83c020)
(09db)
(b)
Fig. 5: An example of normalizing code via Eqv . The original
code (a) is transformed via Eqv (b) to decrease the lexico-
graphic order.
push edx
push ebx
mov dh, 0x4
mov bh, 0x3
pop ebx
pop edx
(52)
(53)
(b604)
(b703)
(5b)
(5a)
(a)
push edx
push ebx
mov bh, 0x4
mov dh, 0x3
pop ebx
pop edx
(52)
(53)
(b704)
(b603)
(5b)
(5a)
(b)
push edx
push ebx
mov bh, 0x3
mov dh, 0x4
pop ebx
pop edx
(52)
(53)
(b703)
(b604)
(5b)
(5a)
(c)
push edx
push ebx
mov dh, 0x3
mov bh, 0x4
pop ebx
pop edx
(52)
(53)
(b603)
(b704)
(5b)
(5a)
(d)
Fig. 6: The normalization process can get stuck in a local min-
ima. The lexicographic order of the original code (a) increases
when reassigning registers (b) or reordering instrcutions (c).
However, composing the two transformation (d) decreases the
lexicographic order.
Alg. 2 presents a psuedocode of the normalization algo-
rithm. The algorithm receives a binary x and the number of
iterations niters as inputs. It begins by drawing a random
variant of x, by applying all the transformation types to each
function at random (line 1). The algorithm then proceeds to ap-
ply each of the individual normalization operations to decrease
the lexicographic representation of the binary (lines 14–24),
while self-supervising the normalization process. Specifically,
the algorithm keeps track of the last iteration an operation
decreased the binary’s representation (line 19). If none of
the four operations affect any of the functions, we deduce
that the normalization process is stuck in a (global or local)
minima, and a random binary is drawn again by randomizing
all functions (limes 10–12), and the normalization process
restarts.
When niters → ∞ (i.e., the number of iterations is large
enough), Alg. 2 would eventually converge to a global minima.
Namely, it would find the variant of x with the minimal
lexicographic representation. In fact, we are guaranteed to find
norm(x) even if we simply apply the transformation types
at random x for niters → ∞ iterations. When testing the
algorithm with two binaries of moderate size, we found that
niters=2,000 was sufficient to converge for the same respective
variants after every run. These variants are likely to be the
global minimas. However, executing the algorithm for 2,000
iterations is computationally expensive, and impractical within
the context of a widely deployed malware-detection system.
Hence, for the purpose of our experiments, we set niters=10,
Algorithm 2: Binary normalization.
Input : x, niters
Output: xmin
1 xˆ← RandomizeAll(x);
2 i, lastupdate ← 0, 0;
3 xmin ← xˆ;
4 while i < niters do
5 if i%4 = 0 then
// Normalization operations
6 ops ← {};
7 for f ∈ xˆ do
8 ops[f ] = {Eqv ,Regs,Ord1 ,Ord2};
9 end
// If stuck, randomize and restart
10 if i− lastupdate ≥ 4 then
11 xˆ← RandomizeAll(x);
12 end
13 end
14 for f ∈ xˆ do
15 o← pop(ops[f ]);
16 x˜← Minimize(xˆ, f, o);
17 if xˆ 6= x˜ then
18 xˆ← x˜;
19 lastupdate ← i;
20 if xˆ < xmin then
21 xmin ← xˆ;
22 end
23 end
24 end
25 i← i+ 1;
26 end
27 return xmin;
which we found to be sufficient to successfully mitigate the
majority of attacks.
